Concentration risk and the optimal numberof central counterparties for a single asset

Submitted on 29th July 2015

We model the central counterparty (CCP) clearing of a single asset traded over-the-counter by two groups of banks in two currencies. We compare a variety of different clearing set-ups involving one or two CCPs according to their ability to withstand a combined market and banking crisis. Using stress testing, the model shows that the question of the optimal clearing set-up for a specifi c asset is complex and depends on many parameters such as the level of funding available to the CCP(s), the degree of integration between the different groups of participants and the particular risk profi les of these different groups. On the whole, however, a single CCP solution appears less resilient than a two-CCP arrangement when the magnitude of the crisis is large and only more resilient when the magnitude of the crisis is small in relation to the clearing fund of the CCP(s). Another interesting outcome is that the two-CCP set-ups perform better than the single CCP set-up for low levels of participation.

Banque France
Length of Resource
8 pages
Resource File
FABIEN RENAULTPayment Systems and Market Infrastructures DirectorateBanque de France
Date Published
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Resource Type