

IT TAKES VISION

## Recovery & Resolution Plans Dealing with Financial Distress

Eoin King, Eamonn Phelan & Bridget MacDonnell 23 November 2016

### The need for Recovery & Resolution Plans





Agenda			
1	Regulatory Background		
2	Governance and Decision Making		
3	Recovery Strategies – Improving Liquidity		
4	Recovery Strategies – Raising Capital		
5	Recovery Strategies – De-risking		
6	Recovery Strategies – Restructuring		
7	Resolution and Extreme Recovery Measures		



## Introduction Regulatory Background

## **Financial Stability Board (FSB) Definitions**

"Identifies options to restore financial strength Recovery and viability when the firm comes under severe stress"

#### "When a firm is no longer viable or likely to be no **Resolution:** longer viable, and has no reasonable prospect of becoming so"

Regulators typically heavily involved Measures to write down obligations



Plan:

## **Requirements for Large Companies**

## **FSB**

- Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs)
- Undertake recovery and resolution planning
- Paper: "Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions"

- International Association of Insurance Supervisors
- Requirements adopted for Global Systemically Important Insurers
- Papers on methodology for identifying G-SIIs and set of policy measures



**IAIS** 

### **Some General Requirements for Insurers**

US: Financial companies designated for supervision by the Fed

- EIOPA 2016 Annual Work Programme:
  - "... to actively contribute to the development of a European approach to crisis management with particular focus on recovery and resolution plans as a preventive tool."
- At European Insurance Forum in March 2016, Sylvia Cronin of the CBI noted, "Recovery and resolution for insurers is an area of interest for the Central Bank, particularly during 2016"



### **Our Focus**

### Recovery and resolution planning for (re)insurers

### **Options Available**

## Governance for implementation

Market practice (including case studies)



# Governance and Decision Making

#### Parties to be involved

"In order to be effective, a recovery plan needs clear governance arrangements, both in terms of the processes and procedures that govern its development (who develops the plan), maintenance (who updates the plan), implementation (who applies it when needed) and execution (who makes sure that the plan is applied)"

Source: EBA Recovery Planning - Comparative Report on Governance Arrangements and Recovery Indicators All parties ideally involved in development of RRPs



## **Guidelines for drafting plans**

High-level summary of strategies and plan for implementation

Strategic analysis that underlies the strategies

FSB's Key Attributes Paper

Structure of plans & items to include

Conditions for intervention

Concrete and practical options for recovery and resolution measures

Preparatory actions to ensure measures can be implemented effectively and in timely manner

Details of potential impediments to execution of plan



### **Other governance considerations**

Plans will need to be refined as the business evolves

Management Information Systems:

- Details of inter-group exposures
- Asset and liability exposures
- General e.g. number of policyholders, products sold, management structure, etc.



## **Considerations when choosing a strategy – company specifics**

Cause of financial difficulty might imply which particular course of action is best

#### **Other Considerations**

- 1. Type of business
- 2. Products
- 3. Ownership structure
- 4. Nature of assets and liabilities
- 5. Regulatory Jurisdiction
- 6. Credit History
- 7. Profitability
- 8. Group considerations

## **Considerations when choosing a strategy**



## Monitoring

Identify when plans need to be implemented

Could use indicators already in place

Several indicators needed to assess:

- 1. Solvency
- 2. Liquidity
- 3. Potential future issues

Forward looking stress testing



## **Recovery Strategies**

## Recovery Strategies: Improving Liquidity

## **VIF** monetisation

#### Economic value of future profits associated with an in-force book

#### **VIF monetisation:**

- Realising a portion of the VIF as an upfront payment from a third party
- Exchange a share of the expected future profit stream as it emerges

#### **Benefits:**

- Liquidity can be boosted (upfront payment)
- Possible transfer of risk associated with future profits
- Impact on solvency position depends on the prevailing regulatory regime


#### **Downsides:**

- Won't get full value as
   VIF will be discounted
- May not improve solvency position
- Less interest in smaller deals



## Case Study: VIF monetisation in Spain & Portugal

#### Simplified Structure



- Mostly through reinsurance treaties (except Santander)
- Reserves, future premiums and future claims swapped for upfront commission
- PVFP onto insurer's balance sheet that could be used by the bank as capital / dividends



## **Case Study: VIF monetisation in Spain & Portugal**

Sample transactions

Parties Involved	Size	Scope
Santander/Deutsche Bank & Abbey Life	€490m	Spain & Portugal
CaixaBank/ Berkshire Hathaway	€600m	Spain
BBVA/SCOR	€630m	Spain
NovaBanco/ Munich Re	40bp CT1	Portugal



## **Investment Portfolio Rebalancing**

- Sell surplus assets to generate cash
- Divest from positions not core to strategy
- 2<sup>nd</sup> order impacts may get lower yield if moving into less risky assets
- Longer term solution is needed – ALM strategy, regularly rebalanced

#### **Example:**

- CNO Financial Group (formerly Conseco)
- 2002 Chapter 11 bankruptcy (US)
- Sold a number of non-core assets
- e.g. stake in a riverboat casino for US\$260 million and General Motors Building in NYC for \$1.4 billion



## **Other Liquidity Options**

- Securitisation
- FinRe
- Debt financing
- Product restructuring
- Suspension of dividends
- Arrange overdraft or loan facility
- Convert receivables to cash (factoring)
- Request a credit extension
- Seek court protection from creditors

## Recovery Strategies: Raising Capital

## **Subordinated Debt**

#### Subordinated:

- Lenders not repaid until all other liabilities/secured creditors paid
- Interest payments typically higher than regular debt
- Does not increase the net assets liability must also be created
- May improve capital position

- Canadian group Great-West Lifeco
  - C\$2.3 billion subordinated debentures
  - US\$300 million bond with RBCbased triggers
- Norwegian insurer Gjensidige
   Forsikring bond August 2016
  - Write down of debt upon breaching certain Solvency II SCR/MCR thresholds



## **Hybrid Capital**


- Contingent capital hybrid between debt and equity capital
  - Debt allowed to convert to equity following pre-specified events
  - Alleviates financial pressure
  - Eligibility to cover solvency capital requirements varies
- Example: Convertible bonds

## FBD

- €70m convertible bond to Fairfax (Canadian holding co.)
  - 10 year instrument, 7% annual coupon (payable twice yearly)
  - Convertible into ordinary share capital at 37% premium
  - Convertible any time between years
     3 and 10 with one exception
  - Admissible as Tier 2 capital under Solvency II



## **Other Capital Options**





## **Recovery Strategies:** De-risking

## **Recovery strategies – de-risking**

May lead to reduction in technical provisions or capital requirements

#### **Reinsurance:**

- Quota share can reduce technical provisions and capital requirements (but, company could be ceding profitable business)
- XoL or Stop-loss can reduce capital requirements for catastrophe risk
- Counterparty risk introduced but can be mitigated
- Need to convince regulators

#### Longevity transfer:

- Can be based on specific experience
   i.e. indemnity based or based on an
   index (basis risk)
- Aviva example: £5billion longevity swap for staff pension scheme to Munich Re, Swiss Re & SCOR



### **Genuine Transfer of Risk**

"...the Bank will be monitoring closely if firms become active in longevity reinsurance regularly and exclusively for motivations other than seeking a genuine transfer of risk..."

Source: PRA speech, "Risk transfer – and the risks it creates: a prudential regulatory perspective"

"To avoid regulatory arbitrage, the authorities are recommended to analyze unusual reinsurance transactions where material, to see if sufficient risk has been mitigated or transferred to justify the capital benefits gained."

Source: IMF Country Report No. 16/311

Real Transfer of Risk



## **Recovery strategies – de-risking**

May lead to reduction in technical provisions or capital requirements

#### Catastrophe bonds and swaps:

- Issue a bond with repayment contingent on catastrophes not occurring
- Offers good diversification to investors
- Source of liquidity (and may reduce capital requirements)
- But more likely to be issued by a company wanting to write large risks than by a company in financial difficulty



Transferring risk to capital markets since 1994

2015: US Storm Risk Cat Bond raised \$1 billion

2014: \$400 million raised



## **Other De-risking & Capital Management Options**

Investment related solutions	Other Capital Management Measures
<ul> <li>ALM</li> <li>Hedging</li> <li>Unit under-funding (Solvency II specific concept</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>(Partial) Internal Models</li> <li>Undertaking Specific Parameters</li> </ul>



## **Recovery Strategies:** Restructuring

## **Recovery strategies - Restructuring**

#### **Branch structure**

- Single group entity with branches in different territories
- Enhanced diversification
- No need to hold minimum capital for companies that not of sufficient scale
- Could help with capital fungibility

#### Examples:

MetLife and Zurich have European hubs in Dublin

MetLife **ZURICH** 



## **Recovery strategies – M&A**

Sale of a number of subsidiaries (or raising funds through IPO)

Raises liquidity


May raise capital through recognition of goodwill

Case Study



## **Recovery Strategies - Restructuring**

Difficulty due to involvement in trading MBS & CDS and in securities lendingFederal Reserve Bank of New York & US Treasury stepped in to provide support



## **Other Restructuring Options**

#### **New business options**

- Repricing new business
- Changes to underwriting policy
- Closure

#### **Existing business options**

- Increase reviewable charges
- Reduce reviewable benefits

#### Internal Restructuring Measures

- Cost reductions / outsourcing
- Company-funded staff pension schemes



# Resolution (and Extreme Recovery Measures)

#### Harmonised national regimes

"At present, there is no harmonised recovery and resolution approach for insurers in the European Union."

"One of the lessons learned from the recent financial crisis is the need to have in place adequate recovery and resolution tools which will enable national authorities to intervene in failing institutions and resolve failures when these materialise in an effective and orderly manner"

Source: EIOPA chairman, Gabriel Bernardino, speech at EIOPA annual conference in Frankfurt, 18<sup>th</sup> October 2016




## Winding Up





## **Equitable Life**

- Collapse of oldest mutual life company in the UK in 2000
- Policies with Guaranteed Annuity Rates (GARs) (i.e. minimum rate of interest)



#### **Reducing Policyholder Benefits**

Extreme measures whereby policyholder benefits are reduced

# FSB guidance in relation to insurance companies:

"Authorities or the courts would need to determine how a potential shortfall is allocated over time and across creditors and policyholders, subject to respect of the creditor hierarchy." Bankrupt insurers in the USA and Canada in the 1990's:

- Executive Life, First Capital, Confederation Life and Mutual Benefit
- Number of cases where policyholders did not receive full value of policies
- Other cases had delay in receiving what was due to policyholders



Roots of the Crisis

#### What happened?

7 Japanese life insurers failed (April 1997 -March 2001)

#### **Root Causes?**

- Life companies phenomenal asset growth in 1970s & 1980s
- Rapid growth in economy
- Unsustainable equity and real estate bubble
- Insurer assets ballooned
- Bubble burst

# Long term guarantees proved unsustainable:

- Equity prices fell by almost 60% - real estate prices followed
- Government bonds yields fell from 5–6% to 1–2%



First Failure - Nissan Life (April 1997)

 Deficit of ca. ¥300 billion, or 15% of reported liabilities

 Sales suspended, surrenders temporarily banned, administrators

#### Industry leading role in developing solution:

- Creation of a new insurance company, owned by the LIAJ ("Aoba" Life)
- Replacing senior management
- Reduction of interest rate guarantees
- Additional surrender charge
- Transfer of restructured policies to Aoba

 Contribution of ¥200 billion in assets from LIAJ members (via Policyholder Protection Fund)
 Created viable runoff co., later sold to French conglomerate Artemis



Other failures

<b>April 1997</b> Nissan			<b>May 2000</b> Daihyaku	October 2000 Chiyoda & Kyoei	
1997	1998	1999		2000	
		June 1999 Toho	<b>Au</b> Tais	<b>gust 2000</b> sho	March 2001 Tokyo



#### Japan's attempts at a resolution process

- Failed attempt at "Oldco/Newco" restructuring plans
- 1998 Policyholder Protection Corporation (PPC) established
- Court-appointed rehabilitation trustee working together with the PPC
- Capital provided by the white knight & financial assistance from PPC
- Policyholder reserve/cash value reduction (limited to 10%)
- · Reduction in guaranteed interest rate
- Possible policyholder participation in future upside (dividends)
- Many possible legal structures for the relief company

Lessons Learned

- 1. Early action helps to preserve policyholder value
- High lapses led to substantial cash outflows
- Investment management had to focus simply on liquidity

2. Benefits of an institutionalised, well-defined process

Substantial infrastructure and policyholder value was preserved

#### 3. Think holistically and reflect on all sources of value

- Significant sources of value beyond balance sheet assets:
  - Sales infrastructure & customer base
  - Potential unique franchises (e.g. affinity groups)
  - Employee expertise
- Value can dissipate quickly if action is not taken



# **Questions?**

#### **Reliances and Limitations**

- These slides are for general information purposes only. Action should not be taken solely on the basis of the information set out herein without taking specific advice.
- The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily represent the views of Milliman





IT TAKES VISION

Thank you