### Actuaries as risk managers







#### USA: the sub-prime crisis (1)

- Lending spree to individuals with poor credit histories
- Fuelled by high commission rates to intermediaries and low initial interest payments
- Loans securitised and sold on
- Estimated \$1.3 trillion of subprime loans outstanding
- 1.8m loans will have interest rates reset in 2008









#### CDOs – how they work (1)



The Actuarial Profession making financial sense of the future

Source: Morgan Stanley



#### CDOs – how they work (2)



The Actuarial Profession making financial sense of the future



#### USA: the sub-prime crisis (2)

- Exposure (direct and indirect) to sub-prime mortgages has so far caused over \$200bn of losses for banks worldwide, and the IMF has estimated that the total could reach \$510bn, with the rest of the financial sector bearing a similar level of losses
- Many large banks have had to seek additional capital, mainly from SWFs, to maintain ratings
- Over 2,000 rating downgrades of Collateralised Debt Obligations since 1 January 2008

Citi s	ecure	s furt	her \$1	l4bn
Bulk of the money to come from China	about 31bn, while 32bn to 34bn would be raised through a public placement of shares. The formula	sources, largely from sovereign wealth funds, there is also a growing debats about the poten-	government has emphasised a policy of investing abroad to keep the ample liquidity in China	also include China Investment Corporation, which has been mandated by the government to
Capital-raising effort second in two months	<ul> <li>is still being adjusted and there could be inst-minute changes, the people involved say.</li> <li>The deal underscores the death</li> </ul>	tial domestic political reaction, particularly during a presidential election year. The deal second mark the first	from feeding a bubble in shares and property. "They want to recycle money as there is too seek in China," area	invest China's burgeoning reserves abroad and recently injected \$5hn to Morgan Stanley.
By Henny Sender in New York Citigroup is putting the fina touches to its second majo apital-raising effort in as man public market investors, peop fag. Under the proposal being di cused, the bulk of the money about 99th – would come from China. The Kuwati Investmen Authority would contribut	of the problems faced by big banks, which suffered heavy la losses in the US subprime mor- r gage crists. It would follow an y injection of \$7.8m into Citigroup by the Abd Dabb Investment d Attbarty in late November. "The second round is going "The second round is going of a US investment bank in the Middle East. Citi declined to comment. A more US financial mittine tions raise capital from foreign	time that the KAA has invested in an alling US himmcial institution, KIA, which is known as a con- servative investor, is taking a portfolio approach to the US innancial crises, looking to buy small stakes in many troubled funntical firms rather than provide the taking of the many statistic states of the second for comment. The deal highlights China's growing importance as an experter of capital. The Chinase	Fred Fig. a China-isade main affect director at Goldman Sacha. "Because of capital controls, only the government can take the mony and put it officates". "The Chinese party in the Citi- group deal is probably a bank such as the Industrial and Com- mercial Bank of China, or China benet arm of the government, however, the distinction between towever, the distinction between overnment and quasi-private more is often blurred in Chinas. Potential Chinese investors	of Pereign Exchange, or Safe, also investa directly offshore. The Development Bank, of China, which is not Sated, has taken stakes in. fizancial institutions uch as intercaps, EUC in a listed company, which is supposed to be managed in the interests of its shareholders, which is supposed to the managed in the interests of the shareholders, which is supposed CHU's capital-ruleing structure differs from the first round. This converts into CHI shares and pays an 11 per cent coupon.





#### **UK: Northern Rock**

- Northern Rock is a UK mortgage lender which relied heavily on wholesale markets for funding
- In September 2007 a severe liquidity squeeze caused by the subprime crisis led the bank to seek emergency funding from the Bank of England
- News of this caused a run on the bank (the first in the UK for over 100 years) until the UK government stepped in to guarantee deposits
- Attempts to find a private sector buyer failed and Northern Rock has now been nationalised











#### **USA: Goldman Sachs**

- In a rare unplanned investor call, the bank revealed that a flagship global equity fund had lost over 30 per cent of its value in a week because of problems with its trading strategies created by computer models. In particular, the computers had failed to foresee recent market movements to such a degree that they labelled them a "25-standard deviation event" – something that only happens once every 100,000 years or more.
- "We are seeing things that were 25-standard deviation events, several days in a row," said David Viniar, Goldman's chief financial officer.
- "People say these are one-in-a-100,000-years events but they seem to happen every year," says Satyajit Das, a consultant to hedge funds and investment banks. "This episode should make people ask questions about models – I think it could lead to a real reassessment."



#### **Monoline insurers**



- Monolines are insurers which guarantee or "wrap" bonds issued by weaker institutions, to improve their credit rating and thereby reduce borrowing costs
- Exposure to mortgage-backed securities threatened the AAA credit rating of some monolines, leading to potential downgrades of the bonds they have guaranteed
- Some capital raising/restructuring has eased the position, but "negative outlook" remains

Banks	act ov	ver mo	noline	crisis
Citigroup and Barclays	Citigroup and Barclays, is exam- ining options for supporting	Mr Dinallo's initiative has spurred the banks to look at sup- porting the insurance on an indi-	advised by Greenhill while Credit Suisse is advising Ambac.	by late February as it tries to determine how much more capi- tal band insurers need to account
Other bond insurers	Ambac Financial, one of the lead- ing monoline insurers. Separate teams are working with other	vidual basis. Moody's Investors Service and	stripped of its triple-A rating by Fitch, needs to raise \$1bn,	for rising losses from subprime mortgage securities.
may also be bailed out	bond insurers, according to peo-	Standard & Poor's, the biggest	according to analysts. Uncer-	Shares in the bond insurers
	ple close to the process.	credit rating agencies, have	tainty about whether Ambac and	rose yesterday on the news that
Aline van Duyn and Henny Sender in New York	by Eric Dinallo, New York state	triple-A ratings of Ambac and MBIA. This would force banks to	time to avoid losing their triple-A ratings has weighed on senti-	cash into Ambac, first reported by CNBC.
and Peter Thal Larsen in London	suade the banks to back an	make further writedowns or pro-	ment in the equity markets.	By the close in New York,
	industry-wide bail-out for the	vide more capital against invest-	A report this week by Oppen-	Ambac was up 13.4 per cent to
Leading US and European banks	beleaguered guarantors.	The group of banks looking at	heimer said extra writedowns for	\$13.20, and MBIA was up 5.55 per
are joining forces to find solu-	John Thain, chief executive of		banks following credit ratings	cent to \$16.36.
bond insurers, whose problems	Times that such an industry-wide	group, Wachovia, Barclays, Royal	Time is running out for the	their share prices fall by nearly
threaten to exacerbate the	solution would be "hard to get"	Bank of Scotland, Société Géné-	bond insurers. Moody's said this	80 per cent in the past 12 months.
impact of the credit squeeze.	given the banks' different expo-	rale, BNP Paribas, UBS and	week it would complete a review	www.ft.com/monolines
One group of banks, including	sures to the credit insurers. But	Dresdner. The group is being	of the bond insurance industry	



#### France: Société Générale



- Futures trader Jérôme Kerviel built up €50bn exposure to world equity markets by creating a fictitious offsetting portfolio and bypassing control systems
- By the time the exposure had been closed out, losses of €4.9bn had been incurred





#### **UK: Equitable Life**

- World's oldest mutual life assurer – founded 1762
- Invented participating life insurance
- Ran into serious financial difficulties in 2000 as a result of generous guarantees and falling interest rates, exacerbated by loss of court case
- Closed to new business, but has remained solvent



#### Dr William Morgan (Chief Actuary 1775 – 1830)





#### **Canada: Confederation Life**

- Largest life insurance company failure in North America
- Started 1990s with 75% of assets in real estate and mortgages
- S&P downgraded from A+ to BBB+ one week before liquidators took over in August 1994, having been AAA until January 1992





#### Australia: HIH

- Australia's second largest P&C insurer
- Became insolvent in March 2001
- Losses up to \$5.3 bn Australia's largest ever corporate collapse
- Multiple causes including culture/ uncontrolled expansion/ underpricing/ inadequate reserves/ weak auditors
- Directors jailed for fraud/insider dealing











#### **UK: Independent Insurance**

- Major UK P&C insurer
- Grew rapidly after formation in 1986 and was listed in 1993
- Became insolvent in 2001 after company revealed large numbers of claims that had been concealed
- CEO Michael Bright jailed for 7 years in 2007







#### USA: Long Term Capital Management

- Hedge fund used sophisticated models to exploit anomalies in bond and stock prices
- Highly leveraged, based on very favourable borrowing terms
- Built up large exposures to swap spreads and equity volatility
- Failed spectacularly when Russian debt crisis caused turmoil in financial markets
- Bailed out by creditor banks to avert financial crisis





# Japan: benefits cut to facilitate restructuring of failing companies

- Between 1976 and 1993, individual life policies typically guaranteed accumulation rates of around 5.5% per annum
- Interest rates fell sharply in late 1990s and exposed guarantees
- Seven life companies became insolvent between 1997 and 2001, but were restructured and sold without ceasing trading







#### Japan: restructuring approach

- Assets marked to market
- Reserves zillmerised
- Reserve haircut of up to 10%
- Benefits recalculated at lower prospective guaranteed rates
- Moratorium surrender charge imposed

Old name	New name
Nissan Mutual	Aoba Life
Toho Mutual	GE Edison Life
Daihyaku Mutual	Manulife Century
Taisho Life	Azami Life
Chiyoda Mutual	AIG Star Life
Kyŏei Life	Gibraltar Life
Tokyo Mutual	T&D Financial





#### Jamaica: financial meltdown

- In 1995, short term interest rates in Jamaica reached 50% p.a.
- Most bank and insurance products were deposit-like, but funds were invested in illiquid assets, particularly real estate developments
- Companies approached government in 1996 and were bailed out at a cost of 40% of GDP







#### What went wrong? – a summary

	Market	Credit	Liquidity	Insurance	Operational	Group
Confederation Life						
Equitable Life						
нн						
Independent						
LTCM						
Northern Rock						
Japan						
Jamaica						





#### Solvency II reform in the EU

- Risk-based regulatory framework for all insurers based in EU
- Best estimate liability allowing for discretionary benefits, time value of guarantees/options and management actions, plus risk margin for non-hedgeable risks
- Risk based capital requirement based on 99.5% confidence level over 1 year for each risk, aggregated using correlation matrices
- Due for implementation in 2012
- Some regulators already adopting risk-based framework in advance, e.g. UK, Switzerland, Sweden

Solvency II will significantly change the insurance solvency system in Europe, and may influence developments elsewhere



## Potential shortcomings of risk-based capital models

- Inadequate data to assess loss distributions
- Wishful thinking/choosing "affordable" assumptions
- Appropriateness of 1 year time horizon
- Modelling tail behaviour
- Reliance on past as a guide to the future
- Capturing new types of risk
- Results distorted by simplifications







#### The role of actuaries

- Rigorous analysis of data
- Improved modelling to understand dynamics of business
- Development of "killer scenarios" / "least solvent likely events"
- Standing back, questioning and challenging
- Clear communication to the decision-makers

Applies to all financial institutions, not just insurance companies





#### **Views of one UK politician**

"If we want to avoid these kinds of shocks in the future then we must empower actuaries to ensure that all boards of directors are fully acquainted with the doomsday scenario that could be around the corner" "Actuaries should not be afraid to speak their minds about the risks being taken within the boardroom. On the contrary. They should be encouraged to make sure that directors are fully aware of the entire risk profile of the business."

John Greenway MP



"The only way...is to strengthen stress testing and build effective risk management plans. Actuaries have the skills, experience and expertise to fulfil this critical role."





#### What is the profession doing to help?

- Developing qualifications in Enterprise Risk Management
  - CERA
  - Planned global qualification
- Greater prominence in education syllabus generally
- Researching new techniques and refining existing ones
- Positioning actuaries as the natural choice for complex risk quantification work





### Actuaries as risk managers



