Operational Risk in Asia - Content

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1. Introduction & Definition

MAS issued in June 2012 a consultation paper on the review of the risk based capital framework: the RBC2. Among the proposed amendments is a new risk charge aiming to cover Operational Risk.

SAS ERM Committee decided to set up a dedicated Working Party in order to provide the industry with insights regarding Operational risk management and measurement.

This document aims to present the working party early findings.

Operational Risk is the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems, or from external events.

Operational Risk is the residual risk not covered by other categories of risk, including insurance, financial, credit and liquidity risk.

Operational Risk deals with the governance and management of processes and controls in an organization that cut across all risk categories including insurance, financial, credit and liquidity risk.

Examples of operational losses in the Financial Services industry are provided in Appendix 1.
1. Managing operational risk: Comparing OR to other risks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market / Insurance / Credit Risk</th>
<th>Operational Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definition</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Well-defined</td>
<td>- Lack of universal definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Consistent taxonomy</td>
<td>- Taxonomy is wide ranging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mainly transactional</td>
<td>- Mainly ad-hoc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- available electronically</td>
<td>- Incomplete, wide sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Usually structured</td>
<td>- Often not structured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Complete, quantifiable</td>
<td>- Mostly subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Systems &amp; Methodology</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Maturred</td>
<td>- Developing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Systems are generally available</td>
<td>- Data relationship focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Modelling techniques defined</td>
<td>- Modelling lacking of consistency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Best practice methodology defined</td>
<td>- No commonly accepted methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Function &amp; Personnel</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Academic / highly skilled</td>
<td>- Everyone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Small team of specialist</td>
<td>- Largely generalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Clear ownership</td>
<td>- Ownership is not well-defined</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Applicable regulations in Asia Pacific and in the rest of the world

- The **working party** reviewed the existing regulations and project of new regulations in most of the Asia Pacific countries and in some other significant countries in the rest of the world.

- Some jurisdictions already require or are in the process of requiring the **implementation of comprehensive ERM** that covers the management of operational risks.

- In those cases, insurance companies are expected to **identify, document and monitor** the operational risks, the board of directors being ultimately responsible of their efficient management.
2. Applicable regulations in Asia Pacific and in the rest of the world

- Among the 8 jurisdictions using already RBC model in Asia, (namely Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand):
  - 3 of them have a **explicit risk charge for operational risk (Australia, Japan and Taiwan)**.
  - 1 of them **intends to implement** an additional risk charge for operational risk (**Singapore**).
- The operational risk charge calculation varies from one country to another (refer to appendix 2), it mostly consists in:
  - Applying a **risk factor** (from 0.15% to 4% depending on the line of business)
  - To an **aggregate** (such as earned premium or gross policy liabilities).

3. Managing operational risk: Challenges

Businesses are ultimately comprised of people. Companies must implement systems & controls to manage people risk, includes the behavior of the business to its people and behavior of people to the business.
3. Managing operational risk: Effective management

- For Operational Risk Management to be effective it has to be:
  - Given **Board sanction** for resources
  - **Reported up to the Board** for appropriate action
  - Introduced into **every layer** of the business structure
  - **Documented and communicated** to every staff member (regularly)
  - Built into **staff performance objectives**
  - Becomes part of the organisational **culture**

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3. Managing operational risk: Typical ORM framework

**Governance**

**Process**

**Key Indicators**
- Identify key risk and control indicators
  - Specify risk appetite
  - Action plans

**Risk & Control Assessment**
- Identify risk and owner
- Assess likelihood and impact
- Identify control and owner
- Assess design and performance
- Action plans

**Events**
- Identify and capture internal and external events
- Analyse causes
- Action plans

**Modelling**

**Reporting**
3. Managing operational risk: Defining ORM governance

“In broad terms, effective governance enables a firm’s board and executive to interact effectively to deliver a firm’s agreed strategy—and, in particular, it is about managing the risks the firm faces.”

FSA Website 2012

- **Strategy**
  - An effective corporate [governance framework](#) allows a firm to manage all aspects of its business in order to [meet its objectives](#)
- **Process**
  - Corporate governance is the [set of processes, policies, guidelines and management practices](#) that create a control framework
- **People**
  - It incorporates the [relationships among the stakeholders](#)

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3. Managing operational risk: Defining ORM Process

- **Risk Reporting**
  - Focus on material risks (including reputational risk)
  - Loss event database should be maintained, capturing both actual operational losses and near-misses
  - Internal & external events should be captured

- **Risk Identification**
  - Common Taxonomy and definition of risks
  - Includes both bottom-up (e.g., Risk & Control Assessment) and top-down approach (e.g., management survey on top risks)

- **Risk Monitoring**
  - Consider both detective and preventive controls
  - Indicators should consider both quantitative measures (e.g., Key Risk Indicators) and qualitative measures (e.g., risk culture survey)

- **Risk Assessment**
  - Ongoing risks (e.g., BAU processes) and emerging risks (e.g., new IT system)
  - Inherent risks (risks before any controls) and residual risks (risks after controls are in place)
4. Measuring operational risk: The loss data challenge

Availability and quality of relevant operational loss data is a key challenge:

- **Quantity issues**: some operational loss are by nature rare or not subject to reporting.
- **Quality issues**: loss data may be incomplete, truncated, censored, reporting bias, mis-classified, heterogeneous, etc.

For the purpose of modeling, the loss data used are often a mix of internal/external, hard/soft loss data.

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4. Measuring operational risk: The loss data challenge

**Source: Internal / External**

- Very few insurance companies started collecting internal operational loss data over a sufficient period of time in order to be relevant.
- **External data** can be public or consortium data. Consortium loss data are expected to be bigger and more reliable, but may be expensive.

The addition of external data to internal data allows bringing high severity and low frequency input.

This combination of different sources of data may require sophisticated scaling techniques.
4. Measuring operational risk: The loss data challenge

Nature: Hard / Soft

- **Hard data** are collected through a robust and systematic process.
- **Soft data** are based on empirical observations, reflecting the expert’s opinion, especially for tail distribution.

There is an urgent necessity for Asia Pacific insurance companies to start collecting **operational loss** data.

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4. Measuring operational risk: Modeling

Regarding the methodologies used to evaluate the capital solvency requirement associated with operational risk, there are generally **three** classes of approaches:

- **Frequency severity** / Monte Carlo / AMA (Advanced Measurement Approach);
- **Stress testing** / scenario analysis approach; and
- **Bayesian** / causal approach, also know as non-linear models.
4. Measuring operational risk: Modeling

- Frequency severity / Monte Carlo / AMA (Advanced Measurement Approach)
  - **Model description**
    - A 2-step approach:
      1. Model operational losses’ frequency and severity for process i and risk k
        With:
        - \( N_{i,k} \): number of losses from process i and risk k
        - \( X_{i,k}^{(j)} \): cost of loss j from process i and risk k
        - \( S_{i,k} \): sum of losses from process i and risk k
      2. Total losses distribution
        - Find CDF of S:
          - If N follows geometric distribution and X exponential → we can find analytical expression
          - Else: Panjer algorithm, Monte-Carlo, etc.
        - Basel II’s AMA is an option for banks to develop their own operation risk model. Most of the time, it is based on frequency severity model.

4. Measuring operational risk: Modeling

- Frequency severity / Monte Carlo / AMA (Advanced Measurement Approach)
  - **Circumstance where the model is relevant**
    - When historical loss data is rich enough to perform statistical modeling on both frequency and severity
  - **Type of data required**
    - Historical loss data for each risk and process (to calibrate the model)
  - **Limitations**
    - Methodology adequate only for high frequency / low severity risks as observed data must be sufficient
    - Relies only on past data → what about new / emerging risks?
    - Risks simulated independently → how to aggregate?
      - Add empirical distributions
      - Allow diversification benefit: correlation matrix, copulas, add VaRs, etc.
4. Measuring operational risk: Modeling

• Stress testing / scenario analysis approach
  • Model description
    • A 4-step approach:
      1. For every risk, ask various departments and / or business units to build scenarios (from their expertise) to model for instance:
        a. Average frequency
        b. Average severity
        c. Extreme severity
      2. Selected adequate distributions for a, b and c
      3. Estimate the distributions’ parameters
      4. Simulate the total loss for each risk (e.g. Monte-Carlo)

• Circumstance where the model is relevant
  • When historical loss data are not substantial enough to use any purely statistical method, like emerging risk.
  • Good to assess high severity risks

• Type of data required
  • Bottom-up approach: experts knowledge used to encompass a wide and credible spectrum of quantified scenarios.

• Limitations
  • Possible high dependency on qualitative impressions.
  • Difficult to conduct back tests as historical loss data is not available.
4. Measuring operational risk: Modeling

- Bayesian and Causal approach
  - Model description
    - This model derives from the scenario based models, it is based on an qualitative analysis and the determination of scenarios.
    - The Bayesian approach adds an analysis of the causal relationships across operational risks that allows measuring certain correlated risks that are not captured in data bases.
    - Once the Bayesian network built, a 3-step approach is conducted:
      1. Exposure assessment: Collect business units’ views on the number of items exposed to operational risk for next year (Maximum of 1 loss per risk per year).
      2. Frequency assessment
         - Binomial distribution B(n,p) with:
           - n: number of exposed items
           - p: probability to estimate (empirically, from experts or combined)
      3. Severity and KRI definition assessment:
         - 3 scenarios: optimistic / best estimate / pessimistic (25%/50%/25%)
         - Build empirical distribution on historical loss data where data exists.

4. Measuring operational risk: Modeling

- Bayesian and Causal approach
  - Circumstance where the model is relevant
    - When we combine availability of:
      - Historical loss data
      - Valuable experts knowledge from experience
    - Model external / new / emerging risks with scarce data available
    - Allows to identify key variables that impact the most the company and then concentrate the risk mitigation efforts on those variables.
  - Type of data required
    - Historical loss data
    - Conditional probability
    - Experts knowledge
  - Limitations
    - High reliance on conditional probability (i.e. probability that risk occurs knowing exposure X), ie expert knowledge.
5. Conclusion

• Depending on the management’s ambition, Operational Risk management can be either:
  • A compliance exercise, easier and cheaper to execute; or
  • A strategic exercise, requiring significant resources.

• The compliance exercise will be based on:
  • High level understanding of key Operational Risks;
  • Prevention and post-mitigation; and
  • Benchmark based quantification.

• The strategic exercise will rely on:
  • A proper governance framework; and
  • Own processes covering identification, measurement, monitoring and reporting.

5. Conclusion

• Next steps:
  • Survey about operational risk management practices;
  • Assessment of the operational risk charge impact on the capital requirements for Singaporean insurance companies according to:
    • Singapore RBC2;
    • European Solvency 2; and
    • APRA LAGIC.
  • Ongoing dialogue with the MAS
  • For the purpose of modeling, collecting operational risk loss data...
5. Conclusion

Appendixes

1. Most significant Operational losses in the FS industry
2. Capital requirement for Operational Risk - examples
3. Managing operational risk:
   a) Example of ORM governance structure
   b) Key Risk Indicators (KRIs)
   c) Risk & Control Self Assessment (RSCA)
   d) RSCA Overview
   e) Example of Risk Assessment Heat Map
   f) Risk Event Data Base
4. Bibliography
5. Contributors
### Appendix 1: Most significant Operational losses in FS industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name of trader</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Instruments</th>
<th>Loss</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barings Bank</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Nick Leeson</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Nikkei index futures</td>
<td>GBP 827m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daiwa Bank</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Toshihide Iguchi</td>
<td>Japan, US</td>
<td>US T-bonds</td>
<td>USD 1.1bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumitomo Corporation</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Yasuo Hamanaka</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>USD 2.6bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allish Irish Bank</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>John Rusnak</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Foreign exchange options</td>
<td>USD 691m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Aviation Oil</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Chen Jiulin</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Jet fuel futures</td>
<td>USD 550m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amaranth Advisors</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Brian Hunter</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Natural gas futures</td>
<td>USD 6.5bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societe Generale</td>
<td>2006-08</td>
<td>Jerome Kerviel</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Euro stock index futures</td>
<td>EUR 4.9b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Caisse d' Epargne</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Boris Picano-Nacci</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Equity derivatives</td>
<td>EUR 751m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBS</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Kweku Adoboli</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>S&amp;P 500, DAX, EuroStoxx index futures</td>
<td>USD 2.3bn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Operational failure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian Securities Exchange</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Collapse of national network system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBS Bank</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>7-hour island-wide system outage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCBC Bank</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>4-hour island-wide system outage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Company</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Corporate governance failings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coutts</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Inadequate controls to prevent money laundering</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Fraud

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Loss</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Ponzi scheme</td>
<td>USD 50bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBS</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Internal fraud: False accounting of unauthorized trade deals</td>
<td>GBP 1.3bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBS Bank</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>External fraud: Unauthorized withdrawals</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBS Bank</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>External fraud: Unauthorized withdrawals</td>
<td>SGD 500k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barclays Bank</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>UK, US</td>
<td>Interest rate rigging</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBS</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>UK, Switzerland</td>
<td>Interest rate rigging</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai Fanxin Insurance Agency</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Insurance agency scam: Unauthorized sale of fixed-income wealth management products</td>
<td>CNY 500m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Appendix 2: Capital requirement for Operational Risk – examples

**Singapore’s MAS RBC 2 (CP June 2012)**

- **MAS proposes to incorporate an explicit risk charge to capture operational risk within the RBC 2 framework, calculated as:**
  
  x% of the higher of the past 3 years’ averages of
  - (a) earned premium income;
  - (b) gross policy liabilities

  subject to a maximum of 10% of the total risk requirement

- Where x = 4%

  (except for investment-linked business, where x = 0.25% given that most of the management of investment-linked fund is outsourced)
Appendix 2: Capital requirement for Operational Risk – examples

• Europe’s Solvency 2 project (QIS5)

\[ \text{SCR}_{\text{Operational}} = \min\left[ 0.3 \times \text{BSCR} ; \max\left( \text{Op}_{\text{premiums}} ; \text{Op}_{\text{provisions}} \right) \right] + 0.25 \times \text{Exp}_{ul} \]

- With:

\[ \text{Op}_{\text{provisions}} = 0.0045 \cdot \max\left( 0; \text{TP}_{\text{life}} - \text{TP}_{\text{life-ul}} \right) + 0.03 \cdot \max\left( 0; \text{TP}_{\text{non-life}} \right) \]

\[ \text{Op}_{\text{premiums}} = \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
0.04 \cdot \left( \text{Earn}_{\text{life}} - \text{Earn}_{\text{life-ul}} \right) + 0.03 \cdot \text{Earn}_{\text{non-life}} \\
+ \max\left( 0; 0.04 \cdot \left( \text{Earn}_{\text{life}} - 1.2 \cdot \text{pEarn}_{\text{life}} - \left( \text{Earn}_{\text{life-ul}} - 1.2 \cdot \text{pEarn}_{\text{life-ul}} \right) \right) \right)
\end{array} \right. \]

- \( \text{Exp}_{ul} \) denotes the amount of expenses incurred during the previous 12 months in respect of life insurance contracts where the investment risk is borne by policy holders.
- \( \text{TP} \): Technical Provision
- \( \text{Earn} \): Earned Premium
- \( \text{BSCR} \): Basic Solvency Capital Requirement

Appendix 2: Capital requirement for Operational Risk – examples

• Australia (LPS118) – Life insurance

- Operational Risk Charge (ORC) is the combination of a charge for risk business (ORCR), for investment link business (ORCI) and for other business (ORCO):

\[ \text{ORC} = \text{ORCR} + \text{ORCI} + \text{ORCO} \]

\[ \text{ORCR} = A \times \left[ \max\left( \text{GP}_{t} ; \text{NL}_{1} \right) + \max\left( 0; |\text{GP}_{1} - \text{GP}_{0}| - 20\% \times \text{GP}_{0} \right) \right] \]

\[ \text{ORCI or ORCO} = B \times \left[ \text{NL}_{1} + \max\left( 0; \text{GP}_{1} - 20\% \times \text{GL}_{0} \right) + \max\left( 0; \text{C}_{1} - 20\% \times \text{GL}_{0} \right) \right] \]

- Where:
  - \( A \) is 2% for statutory funds of specialist reinsurer and 3% for other funds
  - \( \text{GP}_{t} \) is gross premium for the 12 months ending on the reporting date at time \( t \)
  - \( \text{NL}_{1} \) is the net adjusted policy liabilities at the reporting date
  - \( B \) is 0.15% for statutory funds of specialist reinsurer and 0.25% for other funds
  - \( \text{GP}_{1} \) is gross premium income for the 12 months ending on the reporting date at time 1
  - \( \text{GL}_{0} \) is gross adjusted policy liability for the 12 months ending on the reporting date at time 0
  - \( C_{1} \) is all gross payments to meet liabilities to policy owners for the 12 months ending on the reporting date a time 1.
Appendix 2: Capital requirement for Operational Risk – examples

• Australia (GPS118) – Non Life insurance
  • Operational Risk Charge (ORC) is the combination of a charge for inward reinsurance business (ORCI) and for not inwards reinsurance business (ORCNI).
    \[
    ORC = ORCI + ORCNI
    \]
    \[
    ORCI = 2\% \times \left[ \max (GP_1; NL_1) + \max (0; |GP_1 - GP_0| - 20\% \times GP_0) \right]
    \]
    \[
    ORCNI = 3\% \times \left[ \max (GP_1; NL_1) + \max (0; |GP_1 - GP_0| - 20\% \times GP_0) \right]
    \]
  • Where:
    • \( GP_1 \) is gross premium revenue for the 12 months ending on the reporting date at time \( t \)
    • \( NL_1 \) is the net adjusted policy liabilities at the reporting date

• Japan – Life insurance
  • Operational risk is captured by the Management Risk Capital (MRC):
    \[
    MRC = ( R1 + R2 + R3 + R7 + R8 ) \times \text{(Risk factor)}
    \]
  • Where:
    • \( R1 \) is the risk capital for insurance risk
    • \( R2 \) is the risk capital for interest-crediting risk capital
    • \( R3 \) is the risk capital for asset risk
    • \( R7 \) is the risk capital for products with minimum guarantee benefits
    • \( R8 \) is the risk capital for insurance risk relating to third-sector products

• Taiwan
  • Operational risk charge (C4) is:
    \[
    C4 = x \times \text{premium income} + 0.25\% \times \text{assets under management}
    \]
  • Where \( x = 0.5\% \) for life business, \( 1\% \) for annuity business and \( 1.5\% \) for all other business.
Appendix 3: Example of ORM Governance Structure

Appendix 3: Defining ORM Process – Key Risk Indicators (KRIs)

Key Risk Indicators are measures used to monitor and manage an entity’s level of risk and the effectiveness of controls

- KRI should monitor both inherent and residual risk levels
- KRI should focus on both the internal and external environment
- KRI should be S.M.A.R.T. (specific, measureable, actionable, relevant, and timely)
- Each KRI should be approved through established governance channels

Building KRIs – key questions to ask!

- Is the indicator useful? Meet with key stakeholders to identify data being used in business today that can help us identify potential risks (e.g., IT/System Logs, Net Promoter Score, compliant logs, Internal event database, outstanding reconciliation items)
- Is the indicator subjective? Indicators should, as far as possible, be objective, not subjective
- Is the indicator practical? If data is not available or reportable, the cost of designing/capturing new indicators should be weighed against the potential benefit
- Is the indicator linkable to business? Linking indicators to the business model should assist in identifying risks and opportunities
- Is the indicator understandable? The aim should be for non-subject matter expert to be able to pick up and understand the information with little or no explanation required
- Is the indicator measurable? If you can’t define tolerance levels or unable to develop measurable actions to meet tolerance the indicator is of no real use
Appendix 3: Defining ORM Process – Risk & Control Self-Assessment (RCSA)

RSCA is a process to assess risks and evaluate the effectiveness of the business control environment.

- Helps to create a robust framework for operational risk management (ORM) in the organisation.
- The RCSA process supports the identification, analysis, reporting and monitoring of key processes, risk, controls and remediation plans across the organisation.
- The four data forms which include risks, controls, issues and action items are created to collect risk data from process owners in each business entity.
- With the implementation of a broad, accurate and comprehensive risk data aggregation, we are positioned to perform full scale risk analysis to minimize and mitigate operational risks.

Building RCSA Framework

- To implement rigorous quality control measures in data capturing and management processes.
- To conduct process that fully meet local regulator expectations for self assessment framework.
- To incorporate all compliance related risk into a single reporting software platform.
- To increase focus on fewer “critical” risks but nonetheless aggregate exposure to key risk themes.
- To constantly review risk measurement metrics, bearing in mind the limitation of reporting tools such as heat maps (e.g., it is one-dimensional, not risk weighted).

Appendix 3: Defining ORM Process – RCSA overview

Key Issues:

The RCSA process is a sub-set of a broader, strategic “total quality management” continuous process improvement program.

The method calls for self-identifying breakdowns in processes and controls to improve risk management.

In the absence of a broader strategic continuous process improvement program, this methodology is challenging to implement.

RCSA is a “living” tool that seeks continuous improvement of the process.
Appendix 3: Defining ORM Process – Risk Assessment Heat Map (Example)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inherent Risk Rating: Before Controls</th>
<th>Residual Risk Rating: After Controls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Severity</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catastrophic (6)</td>
<td>Catastrophic (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (5)</td>
<td>High (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant (4)</td>
<td>Significant (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor (3)</td>
<td>Minor (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal (1)</td>
<td>Minimal (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unanticipated (1)</td>
<td>Unanticipated (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very rare (2)</td>
<td>Very rare (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rare (3)</td>
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<td>Moderate (4)</td>
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<td>Frequent (5)</td>
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<td>Regular (6)</td>
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Limitation of Heat Maps:
- Heat mapping process is one dimensional (i.e. can’t assess correlation & interaction between several risks)
- Heat mapping process does not weight the risk ranking
- Even if risk weighted, the uni-dimensional feature limits the ability to assess exposures that may present a compounding of risk

Appendix 3: Defining ORM Process – Risk Event Database

An Operational Risk Event is the materialization of operational risk that leads to one or more impacts. These events can happen at any time and in any part of the business. An impact can be either:
- **Financial** – direct financial loss resulting in a negative cash flow
- **Non-financial** – reputational damage, business disruption, regulatory intervention

A Risk Event Database is the centralised depository where operational risk events are being captured, stored and analysed.
- Both internal and external events which impact business should be captured
- Consider changes in business which can lead to an increase in risk likelihood and/or impact

Building a Risk Event Database
- Define an operational risk event, and use it consistently across the organisation
- Define thresholds/criteria for risk event notification
- Report and document risk events information in a centralised database tool (e.g., OpenPages)
- Risk Event descriptions should be objective, cohesive and must provide enough information to allow understanding of the event/loss (e.g., describe incidents in terms of financial impact and/or non-financial impact, no personal opinion or speculations, etc)
- Track and monitor action taken to address risk event and actions to prevent reoccurrence
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